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Casenote
THE "FAIR USE" DOCTRINE AND
CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE:
COPYRIGHT WATERS REMAIN MUDDY
I. INTRODUcTION
Parody1 is a historic and time-honored form of expression
which has been utilized for centuries by many authors of classic
works.2 This form of expression is "an independent art form of an-
cient lineage"3 that realizes its satiric purpose by closely paralleling
another author's work.4 "A parody must convey two simultaneous
- and contradictory - messages: that it is the original, but also
that it is not the original and is instead a parody."5 As such, parody
has been the subject of controversy in the entertainment field since
the turn of the century, when various federal courts decided early
cases on the issue of whether parody constituted copyright
infringement.6
1. Webster's Dictionary defines parody as "an imitation of a musical composi-
tion in which the original text or music has been altered usually in a comical man-
ner." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicIONARY 1643 (16th ed. 1971).
Webster's further defines parody as "a writing in which the language or style of an
author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule often with certain
peculiarities greatly heightened or exaggerated." Id.
2. Charles C. Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech - The Replacement of the Fair Use
Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 39, 40 (1980). Parody
originated in Greek literature around 500 years B.C. Id. Aristophanes, an ancient
Greek playwright, was well-known for his parodic efforts, such as his play, The Frogs.
Id. at n.4. Parody is also present in the works of classical authors such as Cervantes,
Chaucer, Shakespeare and Twain. Id. at 41. Although parody as a form of expres-
sion dates back to ancient times, litigation involving parodists and owners of copy-
rights are a product of the last century. Susan Lineharn Faaland, Comment, Parody
and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. Rv. 163 (1981).
3. Faaland, supra note 2, at 163.
4. Id. In this form of satire, the parodist achieves the intended effect by mim-
icking the structure or wording of the original work. Id.
5. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989). While the parody is a source of humor, it is also a
source of criticism for the original work, which makes its inherent contradiction
more profound. Faaland, supra note 2, at 164.
6. Note, The Parody Dfense To Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use After
Betama, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1395, 1401 (1984) [hereinafter Parody Dqense]. The
early parody cases involved vaudeville impersonations of popular performers of the
day. Id. The impersonators parodied songs that made the original performer fa-
mous. Id. See Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Minzen-
(311)
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Federal courts developed the Fair Use Doctrine 7 as an equita-
ble defense to a claim of copyright infringement.8 Prior to the ma-
jor parody cases, fair use of copyrighted material was defined as "a
privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner without his consent,
notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner of the copy-
right."9 Congress attempted to solidify the Fair Use Doctrine when
it passed the Copyright Act of 1976 ("the Act"). 10 Section 107 of
the Act lists four factors for courts to consider in determining
whether the use of a copyrighted work is a fair use.' The most
current fair use issue considered by the courts and to which the
four factors are applied is musical parody.'2
The only parody case to be heard by the United States
Supreme Court since Jack Benny's "Gaslight" parody case' 3 in the
1950's is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.14 In Acuff-Rose, the Court,
sheimer, 177 F. 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
The courts in these early parody cases focused on the effect upon the com-
mercial market for the original work, and whether the parody harmed this market.
Parody Defense, supra at 1401. Later, some courts recognized that the parody's im-
pact on the commercial market was the most important determinant of whether a
parody violated copyright law. These courts found that when there was not direct
competition between the parody and the original work, parody was socially valua-
ble. Therefore the courts did not restrict use of the original works in parody. Id.
7. "Fair use is a doctrine that allows copying from a copyrighted work so long
as the appropriation is reasonably expected and not harmful to the rights of the
copyright owner." Goetsch, supra note 2, at 45.
8. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the
case, see infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
9. H. BALL, THE LAw oF COPRIGHT AND LrrERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). How-
ever, "[copyright] protection is not lost simply because the allegedly infringing use
is in connection with a work of artistic expression." Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870
F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989).
10. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
11. Id. Section 107 of the Copyright Act reads, in pertinent part:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include- (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.
12. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
13. Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom.
Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. by an equally
divided court, CBS, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). For a discussion of this
case, see infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
14. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
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in applying the section 107 four-factor test, decided that the rap
group 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's song "Oh Pretty Wo-
man" could be a fair use of the original copyrighted song. 15 The
Court held that the commercial nature of the parody did not create
a presumption that would preclude a finding of fair use. 16
This Note will explore the history and development of the Fair
Use Doctrine in the courts and will discuss the Copyright Act of
1976. Additionally, this Note will appraise the Court's analysis of
the issue and contemplate the impact that the Acuff-Rose decision
will have on parodists and other entertainers.
II. BACKGROUND
Copyright is the protection of an "author... or artist's right in
the work he or she has created ...."17 Copyright protection ex-
tends to "original works of authorship" as defined by the Copyright
Act of 1976.18 Copyright owners have the presumably exclusive
right to the content of their original works and exclusive control
over the authorization for others to use those works.' 9 However,
various exceptions in current copyright law limit this right.20 To
use an original copyrighted work without permission from the copy-
right owner constitutes a violation of copyright law and principles.
However, in the case of certain uses, like parody, it is unclear
whether a copyright owner's rights have been violated.
Parodies walk a fine line between copyright infringement and
fair use of the original work they parody. In order to achieve the
desired effect of parody, the artist often must use considerable por-
15. Id. at 1179.
16. Id. at 1171-79.
17. Robert B. O'Connor, Comment, Rap Parodies?: An In-Depth Look at Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 2 FoRnDtAm ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PRop. L.F. 239, 240
(1992). Copyright's purpose, as stated in the United States Constitution is "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful arts .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 102 of the Copyright Act
states that protected works of authorship protected by copyright include:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
Id. However, copyright protection does not extend to abstract ideas, facts or con-
cepts. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
20. Id. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-18 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1995]
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tions of the original product.21 As a result, parodists and their
products have periodically found themselves at odds with copyright
law.22 However, the judicially created Fair Use Doctrine23 was fi-
nally codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.24
A. Development of the Fair Use Doctrine
Soon after the concept of "copyright" was recognized and codi-
fied in the 1700s, 25 courts acknowledged that not all uses of copy-
righted material violate copyright law.2 6 In 1841, Justice Story
outlined various factors to be considered in determining fair use
issues.27 The term "fair use" was first used in a 1869 case.28 The
Fair Use Doctrine continued as a judicially created rule until it was
codified in the 1976 Act.29 In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress
adopted Justice Story's outline to determine fair use questions.30
The Fair Use Doctrine as applied to parody began to take form
in cases concerning dramatic parody. The first major dramatic par-
ody case was Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.31 The court in this "progenitor
21. Parody DefensA supra note 6, at 1395. For a parody to be effective, it must
"conjure up" the original work in the mind of the listener or reader. Id. at 1403.
In order to effectively conjure up the original work, it is often necessary to use a
considerable portion of the original work in the parody. Id. at 1395. For example,
in a musical parody, it may be necessary to copy exactly the original melody in
order for the song to be recognizable as a parody of an original well-known song.
22. Id. at 1395. Parodists' interests often conflict with the seemingly absolute
right of copyright owners to their "intellectual property." Id. at 1395-96.
23. For background on the development of the Fair Use Doctrine and parody
law, see infra notes 25-107 and accompanying text.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For pertinent parts of the statu-
tory text, see supra note 11.
25. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1990)
(citing Act for Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19; This Act created
copyright.).
26. Id. (citing Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 2 Atk. 141 (1740) (No. 130)).
Courts first described a use of copyrighted material that does not violate copyright
law as a "fair abridgment;" they were later labelled "fair uses." Id.
27. Id. (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
In his opinion,Justice Story outlined the appropriate method for analyzing fair use
issues. Id. An analysis of fair use required exploration into such things as the
"'nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materi-
als used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.' " Id. (citing Folsom, 9 F. Cas.
at 348).
28. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
29. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1992).
30. Leval, supra note 25, at 1105.
31. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Bennyv. Loew's, Inc., 239
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. by an equally divided court, CBS, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). In 1942, Loew's Inc. obtained the exclusive mo-
tion picture rights to the original play "Gaslight" by Patrick Hamilton. Id. at 168.
[Vol. II: p. 311
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of the major parody cases" entered into "virgin territory."3 2 In
Loew's, the comedian Jack Benny "caused to be written, produced,
performed, and broadcast over a national radio network," a spoof
of the dramatic movie "Gaslight."33 In 1952, Jack Benny and Bar-
bara Stanwyck performed a similar spoof of "Gaslight" on a half
hour television program.34 At trial, the district court found that
Benny had used substantial portions of "Gaslight" to create his
spoof, and that the TV show was an infringement of Loew's
copyright.35
On appeal, Benny contended that the spoof was protected by
the concept of "fair use."36 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit observed that without the substantial material
copied from the original copyrighted work, all that would remain in
the spoof were "a few gags, and some disconnected and incoherent
Loew's then spent considerable sums of money to produce and distribute the origi-
nal motion picture; the production of the film took almost two and a half years.
Id. "Gaslight" was released nationally and internationally on May 5, 1944, and
Loew's subsequently copyrighted the movie. Id. In November, 1946, the movie
was "withdrawn from domestic release," but was still distributed internationally at
the time of trial. Id. At the time, it was customary for film companies to re-release
films which enjoyed a great deal of success, after a five year period following the
original release. Id. At the time of trial, Loew's had not, however, followed this
custom; the film was viewed by the court. Id.
32. Alvin Deutsch, Parody or Piracy? Jack Benny's Faustian Compact, 11 Er. AND
SPORTS LAw., v. 2, 22 (Summer 1993).
33. Loew's, 131 F. Supp. at 168. Ingrid Bergman, who starred in the original
film, performed the leading role opposite Jack Benny in the spoof of "Gaslight."
Id. Bergman furnished her copy of the original copyrighted script to Benny with-
out notifying Loew's. Id. Loew's, as owner of the copyright, gave consent to
neither the show nor Bergman's actions. Id. Loew's, however, made no claim of
copyright infringement concerning the spoof performed on the radio. Id. at 169.
34. Id. at 169. The television program aired onJanuary 27, 1952. Id. Loew's
wrote a letter to CBS on January 30, 1952, implying that Loew's considered the
television spoof to be an infringement of their copyright in the movie "Gaslight."
Id. CBS denied that their actions constituted an infringement and claimed a de-
fense of " 'fair use'" and the "'right to parody literary properties.' " Id. In May
1953, preparations were made to produce a television movie which parodied "Gas-
light," starring Benny and Stanwyck. Id. Again, Loew's communicated that they
considered the previous television spoof and the proposed television movie copy-
right to be an infringement of its copyright, and commenced action against CBS in
June, 1953. Id.
35. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. by
an equally divided court CBS, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). In conjunc-
tion with its finding of copyright infringement, the district court granted an in-
junction restraining CBS from airing the television movie of "Gaslight." Id.
36. Id. Loew's countered Benny's "fair use" defense, stating that there was no
such doctrine and that the Copyright Act "insures to the copyright owners the
exclusive right to any lawful use of their property .... " Id. (emphasis added).
5
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dialogue."3 7 The Ninth Circuit recognized that it was breaking new
ground, stating that before Loew's, "no federal court... ha[d] sup-
posed there was a doctrine of fair use applicable to copying the
substance of a dramatic work."38 Although the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that there will always be substantial similarities between the
two works because of the nature of parody,3 9 it held that the spoof
could not be considered a fair use of the copyrighted work because
the taking was too substantial.4 The Ninth Circuit recognized that
there was an argument that parody was exempt from copyright in-
fringement actions because of its critical nature.41 However, the
Loew's court limited its analysis to the amount of the original work
used in the parody.42
While Loew's was on appeal, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California decided a similar case, Columbia
Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.43 In September, 1953,
NBC, without the consent or knowledge of Columbia Pictures,
aired a skit which parodied the movie "From Here to Eternity."44
37. Id. at 536. The Ninth Circuit noted that without Loew's contributions
from the original work, the television show's "plot, story, principal incidents, and
... sequence of events" would remain the same. Id.
38. Id. Before Loew's, application of the fair use doctrine was limited to cases
involving copyrights in literary works. Id. Fair use cases involved the use of "prior
compilations, listings, and digests." Id. The general rule evolving from these cases
was that the original text could be consulted for research purposes, without consti-
tuting a violation of copyright law. Id. However, the writer violated the author's
copyright in the original work if there was no independent contribution by the
writer modifying the original work. Id.
39. Id. The ultimate issue in Loew's was whether the writer made independent
contributions to the original work in producing the final product. Id. (quoting
Chautauqua Sch. of Nursing v. National Sch. of Nursing, 238 F. 151, 153 (2d Cir.
1916)).
40. Loew's, 239 F.2d at 536-37. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t] he fact that a
serious dramatic work is copied practically verbatim, and then presented with ac-
tors walking on their hands or with other grotesqueries, does not avoid infringe-
ment of the copyright." Id. at 536.
41. Id. at 537.
42. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that there was "only a single decisive point in
the case: One cannot copy the substance of another's work without infringing his
copyright." Id.
43. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955). The district court recognized that Co-
lumbia Pictures was similar to Loew's in that both "represent[ed] . . .collusion [s]
between the economic interests of the motion picture industry and the youthful
and growing television industry." Id. at 349.
44. Id. at 352. James Jones wrote a novel entitled "From Here to Eternity"
prior to February, 1951, and owned a copyright in the novel. Id. at 351. In March
of the same year, Jones gave written consent to Columbia Pictures Corporation
("Columbia") to produce a motion picture based upon the novel. Id. Jones also
agreed that Columbia retain the copyright interest in the movie. Id. Columbia
produced the movie in 1953 and released it in September of that year; Columbia
retained the exclusive copyright in the movie. Id.
6
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The parody was entitled "From Here To Obscurity."45 Columbia
Pictures brought suit against NBC, claiming copyright infringe-
ment.46 The district court stated that copyright law allows those en-
gaged in parody greater license in using copyrighted material than
those engaged in other "fictional or dramatic works."47 The court
reasoned that a parodist must "make a sufficient use of the original
to recall or conjure up the subject matter being [parodied]," in or-
der to accomplish the desired satirical effect.48 Therefore, paro-
dists should be afforded latitude.49 However, like the Loew's court,
the district court in Columbia Pictures focused on the amount of ma-
terial copied from the original work, and held that the taking may
not be substantial. 50 The district court concluded that if the paro-
dist does not intend to deceive the public as to the copyrighted
work's origin, then there is no cause of action.5 1
In 1964, the Second Circuit considered the fair use doctrine in
light of musical parodies, in Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc.52 "Mad
Magazine" ("Mad") published a series of parody lyrics to Irving Ber-
lin's songs in its Fourth Annual Edition.53 The district court found
that the theme and content of the parodies were substantially dif-
ferent from those of the original copyrighted songs, and held that
the parodies did not violate copyright law.54 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that "the ex-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 354. In holding that parodists have greater license in using copy-
righted material, the district court stated that a "burlesquer" needs to recall
enough of the original work in order for the parody to be recognizable. Id.
48. Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at 354.
49. Id. The district court stated that the parodist is given special license in
using incidents in the story, characters, and unsubstantial portions of the story
development and dialogue. Id. The district court specifically excluded the use of
the "general or entire story line" from the fair use exception. Id. (citations
omitted).
50. Id. at 350. The district court also concluded that burlesque is not a per se
defense to copyright infringement actions. Id.
51. Id. at 354. A cause of action for copyright infringement may not be based
solely on evidence that one author capitalized on the efforts of another...." Id.
There must also be an intent to deceive the public. Id.
52. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
53. Id. at 542. The cover of "Mad Magazine" described the material con-
tained within as "More Trash From Mad - A Sickening Collection of Humor and
Satire From Past Issues." Id. at 542-43. The particular group of parody lyrics were
written in the same meter as the original songs and were characterized as "a collec-
tion of parody lyrics to 57 old standards which reflect the idiotic world we live in
today." Id. at 543.
54. Id. at 543. For example, the song "A Pretty Girl Is Like A Melody" became
in parody, "Louella Schwartz Describes Her Malady." Id.
19951 317
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tent to which a parodist may borrow from the work he attempts to
[parody] is largely unsettled."55 Thus, the court established the
"conjure up" test for determining whether the parodies constituted
copyright infringement.56 Applying the "conjure up" test, the Sec-
ond Circuit held for the parodist. Under the "conjure up" test, a
parody does not constitute a copyright infringement if it lacks the
intent and the effect of satisfying the demand for the original copy-
righted work, and if the parodist does not commandeer a larger
portion of the original work than is necessary to "recall or conjure
up" the original work.57
B. Codification of the Fair Use Doctrine
Prior to federal legislation in 1976, courts applied the Fair Use
Doctrine without any bright line rules to follow. The Copyright Act
of 1976 is the most recent attempt by Congress to codify judicially
established guidelines for determining fair use issues. 58 The Act
codified the Fair Use Doctrine, 59 intending to preserve the doc-
trine's historical purpose: the promotion of creativity.60 However,
the Act has been ineffective as a concrete guideline for courts, as
evidenced by the lack of uniform application among courts on the
issue of fair use.
55. Id. at 544. However, the Second Circuit declared that "parody and satire
are deserving of substantial freedom" as forms of entertainment and as "social and
literary criticism." Id. at 545.
56. Id.
57. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545. The Second Circuit clarified the "substantiality"
test set forth in Loew's by developing the "conjure up" test. The Second Circuit
stated that what parodists traditionally used to achieve the intended purpose was
hardly enough to be a substantial taking from the original work. Id. For example,
the court held that the musical parodies at issue did not cross the bounds of ac-
ceptable use of the original work even though they used the same musical meter.
Id. In fact, the court stated that using the same musical meter was inevitable if the
parody was to conjure up the original. Id.
58. O'Connor, supra note 17, at 240. The 1976 Copyright Act also ended the
dual system of copyright law which existed in the United States between the state
legislatures and Congress. Id. Congress allotted itself sole legislative power in this
domain. Id.
59. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (holding that Fair Use Doc-
trine was incorporated into 1976 Act).
60. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994) (citations
omitted). Under the common law rule, an original work was the absolute property
of its creator until the creator agreed to relinquish such right. Stewar 495 U.S. at
236 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907)).
The Fair Use Doctrine was a judicially created response to the common law rule,
and " 'permit[ted] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when,
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.' "
Id. (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co.,
621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
[Vol. II: p. 311
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The ineffectiveness of the Act as a concrete test for courts to
apply is manifest in two cases decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., Inc.,61 the cast of the television show "Saturday
Night Live" performed a musical parody of the "I Love New York"
campaign song.62 The parody was called "I Love Sodom."63 The
district court applied the four factors outlined in section 107 and
held that the parody was a fair use, even though the parody used
the "heart of the composition."6 The district court determined
that the purpose and nature of the use of "I Love New York" was
satire and did not breach the bounds of the "conjure up" test.65
Finally, the court concluded that the parody did not affect the mar-
ketability of the original song because it did not affect the value of
the copyrighted material.66 The Second Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court that the parody used in the sketch was a fair use of the
original song.67
One year later, the Second Circuit decided MCA, Inc. v. Wilson
under very similar factual circumstances. 68 In MCA, the Second
Circuit applied the four factors outlined by section 107 to a parody
61. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per cuiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. Id. at 743. On May 20, 1978, the cast of "Saturday Night Live" ("SNL")
performed a comedy sketch on the NBC network involving a portrayal of the
Chamber of Commerce as the biblical city of Sodom. Id. In the sketch, the city
officials discussed the poor image the city had in the eyes of tourists; they decided
to try a new advertising campaign to bolster the city's tourist trade. Id. The focal
point of the campaign was the parody "I Love Sodom," sung to the tune of the New
York Chamber of Commerce advertising campaign song, "I Love New York." Id.
Elsmere Music, Inc. ("Elsmere") owned the copyright for the "I Love New
York" song and sued NBC for copyright infringement. Id. at 743-44. NBC con-
tended that the use was limited to the extent "necessary to create an effective par-
ody." Id. at 744. Plaintiff countered by saying that the use overstepped the bounds
of the "conjure up" test. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 744. The district court stated that the use of the heart of the compo-
sition in the skit was significant and, therefore, more than de minimis. Id. How-
ever, the district court noted that the use was less than extensive. Id.
65. Id. at 747. Although a substantial portion of the original song was used in
the parody, the district court held that the nature of the advertising campaign
made the song an "appropriate target" for satire. Id. at 746.
66. Esmere, 482 F. Supp. at 747. The district court noted that parody is an
acknowledgment of the parodied work's significance and concluded that the SNL
jingle did not compete with or detract from the New York Chamber of Com-
merce's jingle. Id.
67. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit stated that copyright law "should be hospitable to
the humor of parody...." Id. at 253.
68. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
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of the song "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy."69 The Second Circuit,
agreeing with the district court,70 held that the parody was not a fair
use of the original song.71 The Second Circuit determined that
the nature and purpose of Wilson's song was not to criticize or par-
ody the original song.72 Also, the court refused to overturn the dis-
trict court's findings that the new song was unfairly extensive. 73
The Second Circuit asserted that the factors listed in the Act were
the codification of the common law pertaining to copyright
infringement. 74
In Fisher v. Dees,75 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Copyright Act of 1976 did not,
in fact, provide a definitive test for courts to follow in deciding fair
use issues.76 The Ninth Circuit also noted that Congress intended
that the section 107 factors be used on a case-by-case basis. 77 For
example, the Ninth Circuit stated that a finding under the first stat-
69. Id. at 182-83. FromJanuary 1974 untiljuly 1976, columnists described the
variety show at the Village Gate in New York City as erotic and raunchy, among
other things. Id. at 181. Reporters characterized one of the show's songs as a
"'take-off'" on the Andrews Sisters' and Bette Midler's renditions of the song
"Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy." Id. at 182. The original song was about a soldier in
Company B, and the parody was titled "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C."
Id. When the defendant Wilson, composer of the song, played it for the cast, there
was immediate concern over the similarity between the two songs. Id.
70. The district court held that the parody was unfairly extensive and consti-
tuted a violation of copyright law. Thus, the district court awarded damages to the
copyright owner. Id. at 182.
71. Id. at 185.
72. Id.
73. MCA, 677 F.2d at 185. The Second Circuit also stated that "[wie are not
prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a song, substitute
dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by
calling the end result a parody or satire on the mores of society." Id.
74. Id. at 182.
75. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). Marvin Fisher and Jack Segal, plaintiff/
appellants, owned the copyright to the 1950's song "When Sunny Gets Blue,"
which they jointly composed. Id. at 434. In 1984, representatives of the defend-
ants/appellees, disc jockey Rick Dees, Atlantic Recording Corp. and Warner Com-
munications, Inc., requested Fisher's permission to parody the copyrighted song
and assured them that the parody would be inoffensive. Id. Fisher refused, but
Dees, one of the defendants, released an album entitled "Put It Where The Moon
Don't Shine," containing a parody of the copyrighted song. Id. The parody con-
tained the same initial six bars of music as the copyrighted song. Id. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Id.
76. Id. at 435. Since the four factors for determining fair use are nonexclu-
sive, the courts must modify the doctrine to accommodate the various fact patterns
that they will hear. However, courts must modify the doctrine in a way that allows
the fair use doctrine to retain its vitality. See id.
77. Id. By intending a case-by-case analysis of fair use, Congress "preserve[d]
the doctrine's common law character .... " Id.
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utory factor that the use has a commercial nature does not neces-
sarily lead to a finding that the use is unfair.78
In addressing whether the amount used by the parody was sub-
stantial, the Ninth Circuit rejected the characterization of a parodic
use as de minimis, stating that in order for parodists to accomplish
their satiric goals, the use must be at least substantial enough to
"conjure up" the original song in the mind of the listener. 79 While
the boundaries of what constituted substantial use are not clearly
defined, "copying that is virtually complete or almost verbatim" is
not fair use.80 In Fisher, the Ninth Circuit held that the parody at
issue was a fair use of the original song because it took from the
original song only what was intrinsic to its life as parody.8'
The Ninth Circuit stated that the most important factor in fair
use determinations was the fourth factor, the effect upon the poten-
tial market or value of the copyrighted work.82 Applying the fourth
factor, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the parody fulfilled the
demand for the original work, as this would constitute copyright
infringement.83 According to the Ninth Circuit, an infringement
occurs when the parody replaces the original work within the mar-
ket the original work is intended to fulfill.8 4 In Fisher, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the parody and the original work were not
aimed at the same audiences, and therefore a substitution of the
parody for the original work was not probable.8 5 The Fisher court
78. Id. at 437. The parties in Fisher agreed that the parody at issue was a com-
mercial use of the original work. Id. The court recognized that some commercial
parodies are for social commentary or critical purposes and are not an attempt to
financially exploit the original. Id. (citation omitted). The court determined that
the parody at issue was such an instance. Id.
79. Id. at 435 n.2. In order to fit the definition of parody, a song must be at
least a de minimis, or meager and fragmentary, use of the original. Acuff-Rose Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1992). See also Elsmere Music,
Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
80. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438 (quoting Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S.
1132 (1979)); see also New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc.,
693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta
Coop. Prod., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979); cf. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d
301 (2d Cir. 1992).
81. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439-40. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this par-
ody took from the original song only what was necessary to fulfill its "parodic pur-
pose." Id. at 439. The Ninth Circuit also noted that when a song is parodied, it is
often necessary to copy the music exactly in order for the listener to recognize the
original song. Id.
82. Id. at 437.
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concluded that the balancing between the parodist's attempts to
create a good parody and the copyright owner's rights tipped in
favor of the parodist.86
Other courts have similarly emphasized the significance of the
fourth statutory factor in analyzing fair use cases. In Rogers v.
Koons,87 the Second Circuit considered the issue of whether a sculp-
ture was protected by the fair use doctrine when the inspiration for
the sculpture came from a copyrighted photograph.88 In an effort
to clarify the parodist's fair use defense, the Second Circuit offered
its own definition of parody.89 Applying the four statutory factors
to the particular facts of the case, the Second Circuit held that the
sculpture was not a fair use of the original photograph;90 all of the
statutory factors weighed against a finding of fair use.91 In its analy-
sis, the Second Circuit asserted that the fourth statutory factor was
the most significant in determining fair use,92 and created a balanc-
ing test applicable to the fourth factor. The balancing test weighed
the effect of the use on the market value of the original. 93 The
Second Circuit stated that under the fourth factor, a "balance must
be struck between the benefit gained by the copyright owner when
the copying is found an unfair use and the benefit gained by the
public when the use is held to be fair."94 Additionally, the Second
Circuit presumed that there would be future harm to the original
photograph because of the harm to the market for the photograph
and derivative works.95
The fourth statutory factor also played a significant role in Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.96 In Sony, Universal City Studios
("Universal City") claimed that Sony Corporation ("Sony") was lia-
86. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439.
87. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
88. Id. at 304. In 1980, an acquaintance commissioned Rogers to photograph
his puppies. Id. Rogers spent substantial creative effort on the project and li-
censed the finished product, "Puppies," and other works to Museum Graphics in
1984. Id. Jeff Koons, an artist and sculptor, created a sculpture entitled "String of
Puppies." Id. at 305. Koons admitted that the source for his work was the picture
postcard of Rogers' licensed photograph that he purchased. Id.
89. Id. at 309. The Second Circuit stated that: "Parody... is when one artist,
for comic effect or social commentary, closely imitates the style of another artist
and in so doing creates a new art work that makes ridiculous the style and expres-
sion of the original." Id. at 309-10.
90. Id. at 314.
91. Id. at 309-12.
92. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 312.
96. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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ble for "contributory infringement" on Universal's copyright of vari-
ous television programs. 97 The United States Supreme Court held
it is not necessary to show an actual present harm in order to
demonstrate the effect the use has on the copyrighted work's mar-
ket value. 98 Instead, it was necessary to show, "by a preponderance
of the evidence," that there is a profound likelihood that future
harm will occur.99 The Court held that the sale of the video tape
recorders to the public did not represent such a harm to the mar-
ket for the television programs and therefore did not infringe upon
Universal City's copyrights.100 The Court also stated that the law
does not give a copyright owner "complete control over all possible
uses of his work." 10 1 Specifically, the Court explained that copy-
right owners do not hold an absolutely exclusive right to the use of
their works.102
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,10 3 the
United States Supreme Court applied the Fair Use Doctrine to an
unauthorized version of copyrighted memoirs.10 4 The Court ap-
plied the statutory factors and held that the use of copyrighted ma-
terial in an unauthorized article did not constitute a fair use. 10 5 As
in Sony, the Court focused on the fourth statutory factor, and held
97. Id. at 420. Sony Corporation manufactured video tape recorders (VTR's).
Id. at 422. Universal City Studios (Universal City) owned the copyrights to various
programs aired on television. Id. at 421. Universal City alleged that their copy-
rights were violated when individuals used the VTR's to record the copyrighted
programs. Universal City alleged that Sony Corporation was liable for contributory
infringement of its copyright. Id. at 420.
98. Id. at 451.
99. Id. The Court held that it was not necessary to show an actual future
harm affecting the value of the copyrighted work, but simply a likelihood of future
harm. Id.
100. Id. at 428-56.
101. Id. at 432. The Court noted that copyright law has never guaranteed an
owner absolute rights to his work. Id. at n.13. However, the "natural tendency of
legal rights to express themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is
particularly pronounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned mono-
pol[y] of the copyright .... " Id.
102. Id. at 433. The Copyright Act does not provide the copyright holder with
exclusive control over reproductions of works that are in the public domain. Id.
See also Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
104. Id. at 542-43. In 1977, former President Ford authorized Harper & Row
Publishers and Reader's Digest to publish his memoirs, which were unwritten at
that time. Id. at 542. The agreement gave petitioners the exclusive right to license
excerpts prior to publication. Id. at 542. Harper & Row negotiated an agreement
with Time Magazine for these excerpts, but an unauthorized version containing a
large portion of the copyrighted material was published in another magazine, The
Nation, before the scheduled release in Time. Id. at 543.
105. Id. at 569. The Nation conceded that but for a finding of fair use, the
verbatim copying would be a copyright infringement. Id.
1995] 323
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that interpreting the Fair Use Doctrine to allow the publication of
extensive quotations from a yet unreleased manuscript without con-
sent poses "substantial potential for damage to . . . marketability
.... "106 The Court opined that the final factor was the "single most
important element of fair use."107
III. CAMPBEL. v. A CuFF-RosE MUsic, _INC.
Roy Orbison and William Dees co-authored the song "Oh,
Pretty Woman" in 1964.108 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose) ob-
tained the rights to the song that same year and registered it for
copyright protection. 109 On July 5, 1989, Linda Fine, general man-
ager of Luke Records, wrote a letter to Gerald Tiefer of Opryland
Music, Acuff-Rose's parent company, informing him that the rap
group, 2 Live Crew," 0 wanted permission to parody "Oh, Pretty
Woman.""' Tiefer replied with a letter stating that he would not
106. Id. at 566. In Harper & Row, the unpublished nature of the original work
was critical to the Court's analysis and application of the fourth factor, because
Time refused to pay Harper & Row the remaining fee due on their contract. Id. at
567. See also Daniel E. Wanat, Fair Use and the 1992 Amendment to Section 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act: Its History and an Analysis of Its Effect, 1 Vir.L. SPORTS & ENrr. L.F.
47, 53 (1994).
107. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. The Court noted that economists who
have commented on the issue contend that the fair use exception is only applica-
ble when there is no market for the original work or when the copyright owner
would request only a nominal amount for the use of the copyrighted material. Id.
at n.9.
108. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1168 (1994). Roy
Orbison performed the song "Oh, Pretty Woman," which has become a well-known
popular standard. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1432 (6th
Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
109. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1168. Since the song has become a "pop music
standard," Acuff-Rose has profited substantially from the licensing of various "de-
rivative" works. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1432. These derivative works include
remakes of the song by other artists, commonly known as "cover" recordings. Id.
110. Petitioners Luther R. Campbell, Christopher Wongwon, Mark Ross and
David Hobbs comprise 2 Live Crew, which is a well-known rap music group. Acuff-
Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1168. The Court noted that rap music is a style of black Ameri-
can popular music consisting of improvised rhymes performed to a rhythmic ac-
companiment.'" Id. at n.1 (quoting THE NORTON/GRovE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF Music 613 (1988)).
111. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1432. The district court found that Fine's letter
was written before the release of 2 Live Crew's album "As Clean As They Wanna
Be," which contained a parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman." Id. at n.2. Although the
parties disagree on the sequence of events concerning the letter and the album
release, the Court stated that the timing was irrelevant to the Court's analysis.
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1168 n.2. Ms. Fine stressed that 2 Live Crew intended the
song to be a parody, and that all credits were to be given to Acuff-Rose. Acuff-Rose,
972 F.2d at 1432.
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grant permission for the parody.112 On July 15, 1989, 2 Live Crew
released "Pretty Woman," a parody of the original song, on its al-
bum "As Clean As They Wanna Be."'1 3 In the album credits, 2 Live
Crew acknowledged Orbison and Dees as the composers of the
original song.114 Luther Campbell, the lead vocalist and song
writer for the group, authored the 2 Live Crew parody. 15 He stated
in an affidavit that he intended to satirize "Oh, Pretty Woman" by
using "comical lyrics."" 6 When Acuff-Rose brought suit against 2
Live Crew in 1990 for copyright infringement, nearly a quarter of a
million copies of the 2 Live Crew recording had been sold.' 1 7 The
suit named both 2 Live Crew and its recording company, Luke
Skyywalker Records as defendants. 18 Defendants countered with a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the parody constituted a fair
use." 9 The district court applied the section 107 factors to the facts
112. Id. at 1432. Although Acuff-Rose refused to authorize the parody, 2 Live
Crew continued to sell "As Clean As They Wanna Be." Id.
113. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1168. The record was released by Luke Records,
Luther Campbell's record company. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1432. The district
court found that the album was released onJuly 15, 1989, following the letter from
Ms. Fine. Id. at n.2. The original song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," was the singer's
reflections on a beautiful woman seen on the street. Id. at 1436 n.8. After initially
rebuking the singer, the woman changes her mind. Id. The parody contained
lyrics that are initially identical to the original song, but "quickly degenerate[ ]
into a play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones." Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd,
972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). The song makes refer-
ences to "two-timin' "women, ugly women who are compared to a character from
"The Addams Family" and illegitimate children. Id.
114. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1168. In the album credits, Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc. was acknowledged as the publisher of the original song. Id.
115. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1432.
116. Id.
117. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
118. Id. The suit was brought by Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, for "copy-
right infringement, interference with business relations, and interference with pro-
spective business advantage for the performance and distribution of a copy of 'Oh,
Pretty Woman.'" Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1152.
119. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1152. Both parties filed affidavits, including
those of music experts. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1432-33. Defendants filed the affi-
davit of Oscar Brand which stated that there were musical similarities between the
two songs, such as the drum beat and "bass riff." There were also differences such
as the key the songs were sung/rapped in and additions to the bass riff. Id. at
1433. Brand stated that the 2 Live Crew song was "consistent with a long tradition
•.. of making social commentary through music." Id. In addition, he stated that
the 2 Live Crew parody was one of many African-American attempts to use rap
music to poke fun at "white" popular music. Id.
Acuff-Rose introduced the affidavit of Earl V. Speilman, a Ph.D musicologist,
who determined that the similarities between the two songs were significant and
that even a nascent listener would "readily discern that 'Pretty Woman' was mod-
elled after 'Oh, Pretty Woman.'" Id.
1995]
15
Francis: The Fair Use Doctrine and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Copyright Water
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
326 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
of the case and concluded that summary judgment for defendant 2
Live Crew was appropriate because there were no facts in dispute
concerning the fair use issue. 120
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Campbell and 2 Live Crew.1 21 The Sixth Circuit applied the factors
set out in section 107 of the Copyright Act and determined that the
factors weighed against a finding of fair use.' 22 In its analysis, the
Sixth Circuit emphasized the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's
use of the original song in reversing the district court.' 23 Specifi-
cally, the Sixth Circuit held that any commercial use of a copy-
righted work is presumed to be unfair. 12 4
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit's decision,125 holding that the Sixth Circuit erred by
placing too much weight on the first statutory factor in determining
the fair use issue.126
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Narrative Analysis
In Acuff-Rose, there was no dispute that the 2 Live Crew rap
version would constitute a violation of the Copyright Act "but for a
finding of fair use through parody."127 Thus, the Court was faced
120. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1153.
121. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1439.
122. Id. at 1435-39. Although the Sixth Circuit held that 2 Live Crew's song
was not a fair use of "Oh, Pretty Woman," it recognized that the 2 Live Crew song
was parody in nature. Id. at 1435.
123. Id. at 1436-37.
124. Id. at 1437. The court stated that the district court failed to put enough
emphasis on the commercial nature of the use. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the
"blatantly commercial purpose of the derivative work... prevents this parody from
being a fair use." Id. at 1439.
125. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1179 (1994).
126. Id. at 1174. The Court, per Justice Souter, held that the Sixth Circuit
gave "insufficient consideration" to the other factors in its finding of no fair use.
Id. at 1168. The four statutory factors must be considered as a whole. Id. at 1171.
The nature of parody is such that it warrants a doser scrutiny than the Sixth Cir-
cuit gave. Id.
127. Id. at 1169. The 1976 Copyright Act states that the owner of a copyright
has the exclusive right to such things as reproducing the original copyrighted
work, creating derivative works and distributing the original work. 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). The statute defines "derivative work" as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a... musi-
cal arrangement .... sound recording.. . or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of edito-
rial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as
a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
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with the issue of whether the 2 Live Crew parody of the song "Oh,
Pretty Woman" was a fair use within the meaning of the section 107
of the Copyright Act.128 In its analysis of 2 Live Crew's fair use de-
fense, the Court applied the four fair use factors enumerated in
section 107 of the Copyright Act.1 9 The Court stressed that these
factors are to be "explored" and "weighed together in light of the
purpose of copyright," rather than be considered in isolation from
one another.130
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
Under the first statutory factor listed in the Act, the Court con-
sidered the purpose and character of 2 Live Crew's use of "Oh,
Pretty Woman." 131 Analyzing the nature of the use, the Court ex-
arnined whether the use was "transformative."132 In order for the
use to be transformative, the copyrighted material must be used for
a purpose different from the purpose in the original work or must
be used in a different manner.'33 The Court recognized that true
parody certainly has transformative value, and may, therefore, claim
fair use.'3 4 According to the Court, the transformative value of par-
Id. at § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
128. Id. at 1167.
129. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171-78. Although the Court relied on the four
statutory factors in its analysis, it recognized that there is no bright-line rule in fair
use cases. Id. at 1170 (citations omitted). The Court cited parts of the statutory
language as examples of the open-ended nature of the factors. Id. These factors
provide courts with "general guidance" as to what uses past courts determined to
be fair. Id. Because there are no bright-line rules, all types of uses, including par-
ody, must be judged on a case by case basis. Id.
130. Id. at 1171. The Sixth Circuit's "insufficient consideration" of the factors
as a whole was one reason stated by the Court for reversing the opinion. Id. at
1168. "Each factor directs attention to a different facet of the problem." Leval,
supra note 25, at 1110.
131. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171. The Act states, in pertinent part: "In deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, [a]
factor[ ] to be considered... [is] the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses.. . ." 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
132. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
133. Leval, supra note 25, at 1111. A use can be transformative if it criticizes
the original, as in a parody. Id. The key to being transformative lies in the value
added to the original work. Id. This is because the purpose of the Fair Use Doc-
trine is to encourage endeavors which use an original work as the basis for new and
creative ventures. Id. Although a transformative characterization is not necessary
for a finding of fair use, it could diminish the weight of other factors, such as
commercialism. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (citations omitted).
134. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171. The Court also stated that parody's trans-
formative property gives it a social benefit because parody creates a new work while
shedding light on the original work. Id.
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ody lies in its critical nature.135 Without the element of criticism or
comment, a fair use claim loses credibility.136 The Court went so
far as to say that without criticizing the original, a fair use claim is
reduced in merit.'3 7
The Supreme Court agreed with both lower courts that the 2
Live Crew song, "Pretty Woman," contained parody and thereby
criticized the original song.a38 However, the threshold question in
determining fair use is whether the parody can be "reasonably per-
ceived" as parody.139 The Court held that the 2 Live Crew version
was recognizable as the parody it was intended to be but need not
be labeled as such. 140 The Court also commented that parody
"serves its goals whether labeled [as parody] or not, and there is no
reason to require parody to state the obvious (or even the reason-
ably perceived).-1141
The Supreme Court's most significant criticism of the Sixth
Circuit concerned the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the commercial
nature of 2 Live Crew's use of the original song. 142 The Sixth Cir-
cuit relied on the Court's holding in Sony and held that any use of
copyrighted material for commercial purposes was presumptively
unfair.143 The Acuff-Rose Court criticized the Sixth Circuit for "con-
135. Id. at 1172. In its analysis of parody, the Court extracted elements from
various definitions of parody and determined that comment on the subject of the
parody is critical to its definition. Id.
136. Id. When a commentary on the original work is not of a critical nature,
then it is assumed that the use of the original work has less than honorable pur-
poses. Id. In this instance, other factors, such as the use's commercial value, in-
crease in significance. Id.
137. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1172.
138. Id. at 1172-73. Both the district court and the dissent to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinion recognized that the rap version ridiculed the original work and its
notions of "wine and roses." Id. at 1173 (citing Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,
972 F.2d 1429, 1442 (6th Cir. 1992)). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit majority reluc-
tandy conceded that the song was critical in nature. Id. (citing Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (6th Cir. 1992)).
139. Id. The fair use question is not concerned with whether the parody is in
good or bad taste. Id. The Court recognized that judicial bodies are not qualified
to determine the quality of such works, and refused to comment on the quality of
the 2 Live Crew song. Id. (citations omitted).
140. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173. The comparison of the original song and
the rap version allows its commentary and critical nature to surface. Id. The dif-
ferences between the romance contained in the original song and the bawdiness of
the parody identify the parody as the type of transformative work that Congress
intended the fair use doctrine to address. Id.
141. Id. at 1173 n.17.
142. Id. at 1173-74.
143. Id. at 1174 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984)). Congress did not intend to create any class, such as commercial
uses, which would be considered presumptively fair or unfair. Id.
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fining its treatment of the first factor essentially to one relevant fact,
the commercial nature of the use."144 The Court suggested that the
Sixth Circuit's reliance on one sentence from the Sony decision in
holding that there was no fair use was not only inconsistent with
Sony, but also contrary to the history of the Fair Use Doctrine. 145
The Court stated that Sony actually stood for the proposition that
commercial nature would tend to weigh against a finding of fair
use, but did not create a presumption of copyright infringement. 146
Rejecting the Sixth Circuit's application of the first factor, the
Court stated that the commercial nature of a use does not presume
a finding of unfairness, just as an educational use does not indicate
an automatic declaration of fair use.' 47 If commerciality was dispos-
itive of finding against fair use, then Congress' preamble to section
107, where certain examples of fair uses are listed, would be ren-
dered meaningless.148 The Court adopted a sliding scale of sorts in
its weighing of the commercial value of a parody.' 49 According to
the Court, the use of parody in advertising would be given less toler-
ance than parody sold for its own sake. 150
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, a court must consider
the nature of the copyrighted work in making fair use determina-
tions.15' The second factor acknowledges that certain types of
works are "closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to estab-
144. Id. at 1173. The Court admonished the Sixth Circuit's reliance on the
commercial nature of the use, stating that it gave too much significance to that one
aspect of the purpose and character of the use, and afforded it "virtually dispositive
weight." Id. at 1174.
145. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1174. The Sony Court did not create a bright line
rule as applied by the Sixth Circuit, but rather called for a " 'sensitive balancing of
interests.'" Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 455).
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. Id. Although commercial uses do not mandate a finding of unfair use, a
court may consider the profit/nonprofit distinction in making fair use determina-
tions. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981); see generally Arlen W.
Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First Amendment
Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 36 ViLL. L. REv. 1 (1991) (discussing need to
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial parodies in trademark par-
ody cases).
148. Id. at 1174.
149. Id.
150. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1174.
151. Id. at 1175 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988)). The second factor "im-
plies that certain types of copyrighted material are more amenable to fair use than
others." Leval, supra note 25, at 1116.
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lish when the former works are copied."152 Although the Court de-
clared that the original Orbison song was the type of work that
copyright laws were intended to protect, this fact did not have
much bearing in this case; parodies inevitably copy well-known
works.153 In fact, the Court speculated that the second factor would
not generally affect parody fair use cases because parodies are inevi-
tably directed at creative works that are widely known. 154
3. Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used
Courts deciding fair use issues must also consider the third fac-
tor enumerated in section 107: the amount and substantiality of the
portion of the copyrighted work used in the parody.155 In Acuff-
Rose, the Court determined that the third factor demands consider-
ation not only of the quantity taken from the original, but the im-
portance, quality and purpose of the use.' 56 The Court also
acknowledged that the facts relevant to the third factor may be per-
tinent to the transformative character of the first factor and the
likelihood of market substitution under the fourth factor. 57
However, the Court acknowledged that these third factor de-
terminations must be made differently with regard to parody. 15 In
order for parody to be effective, it "must be able to 'conjure up' at
least enough of th[e] original to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable." 59 The art of parody "lies in the tension between a
152. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1175. The general rule is that "creative works...
are afforded greater protection from the fair use determination than are works of
fact." Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (citation omitted).
153. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
154. Id.
155. Id. Courts must consider the amount and substantiality used of the origi-
nal work in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
The issue is whether the amount used of the original work is reasonable in the
context of the purpose for its use. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
156. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
157. Id. at 1176. The acceptable degree of material used from the original
differs with the purpose of the use. Id. at 1175. Also, the quantity and quality of
the material used will affect the market potentiality for the original work and its
derivatives. Id. at 1175-76.
158. Id. at 1176. Parody necessitates a special consideration of the third statu-
tory factor because its very nature requires a substantial use of the original work so
that the listener can immediately recognize the original work. Id.
159. Id. Once enough of the work is used to make the original work recogniz-
able, the amount of further use depends on the extent to which the predominant
purpose is to parody or the "likelihood that the parody may serve as a market
substitute for the original." Id. It is impossible, however, to avoid using some char-
acteristic features. Id.
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known original and its parodic twin." 160 The Court determined
that the amount that 2 Live Crew used from the Orbison original
was reasonable, despite the fact that it went to the "heart" of the
original. 161 While recognizing that the distinctive bass riff and
opening line of the song may be the heart of the song, the Court
reasoned that it may have been necessary to use this to conjure up
the original. 162 The Court held that although 2 Live Crew used the
heart of the original song in their parody, this did not necessarily
mean that the amount and substantiality of the use was unreasona-
ble.163 Although the Court was unwilling to say that the use was
unreasonable, it did not make a determination on the musical
phrases copied by 2 Live Crew and remanded the case on this fac-
tual issue in light of the other factors.164
4. Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market
The final statutory factor considered by the Court was the ef-
fect of the use on the potential market for, or value of, the original
work.165 Courts must not only consider the market harm to the
original work, but also any potential damage to the market for pos-
sible derivative works. 166
The Acuff-Rose Court rejected the notion that the commercial
nature of 2 Live Crew's use created a presumption of market harm,
160. Id.
161. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1176. The Court stated that the heart of the
original work was what was being parodied. Id.
162. Id. The Court noted that if 2 Live Crew had not copied the heart of the
original song, it would have been difficult for the parodic nature of the song to
come through. Id.
163. Id. In its analysis, the Court opined that it was significant that the 2 Live
Crew parody departed from Orbison's lyrics after the first line and added its own
distinctive sounds and bass riff. Id.
164. Id. at 1176-77.
165. Id. at 1177 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988)). Under the fourth factor,
courts must not only consider the market harm caused by the specific use, but
whether similar conduct by others would affect the potential market for the origi-
nal. Id.
166. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a
"derivative work" as:
[A] work based on one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of au-
thorship, is a 'derivative work.'
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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and held such a presumption to be erroneous.1 67 Thus, the Court
rejected the Sixth Circuit's application of the Sony opinion, and dis-
tinguished Sony by limiting it to "mere duplication[s] for commer-
cial purposes." 168 Conversely, if the use is contained within a
parody, there is less likely to be a market harm because parodies are
transformative.1 69 The Court reasoned that there was less likely to
be any market harm because the two works "serve[d] different mar-
ket functions."170 In addition, the Court emphasized that the only
market harm of concern was that of market substitution, and that
the Act does not address market harm to the original or derivative
works resulting from the parody's effective criticism of the origi-
nal.1 71 The Court maintained that criticism, no matter how brutal,
does not produce the type of market harm that the Copyright Act
remedies.1 72 While the market for derivative works is limited to
"those [works] that creators of original works would in general de-
velop or license others to develop," it does not include critical re-
views or parodies.1 73 The Court would not make a determination as
to what type of market harm the 2 Live Crew song would cause for
the Orbison original because of sparsity of evidence.' 74
B. Critical Analysis
Throughout its analysis of parody and the fair use doctrine in
Acuff-Rose, the Court recognized the inherent social value of par-
ody. 175 Parody sheds new light on an original copyrighted work by
commenting on and criticizing that work.176 In rejecting the Sixth
Circuit's finding that 2 Live Crew's parody constituted an unfair use
of the original Orbison song, the Court wisely aligned itself with
167. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177. The Court assessed the Sixth Circuit's ap-
plication of the fourth factor and determined that the Sixth Circuit erred in dis-
missing the fourth factor as hastily as it had the first factor. Id. Thus, the Court
rejected the Sixth Circuit's reliance on the commercial nature of the use in dis-
missing both the first and fourth factors. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. It is less likely that a parody would act as a market substitute for an
original than if the use were simply a copy of the original. Id. at 1177-78.
170. Id. at 1178.
171. Id.
172. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178.
173. Id. at 1178.
174. Id. at 1177. Neither party produced evidence as to the effect the rap
arody would have on a non-parody rap version of the Orbison song. Id. at 1178-
175. Id. at 1171.
176. Id. The parodist creates a new work through the creative process of par-
ody. Id.
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other courts and commentators, acknowledging parody as a legiti-
mate form of creative endeavor. In transforming one work through
parody, the creator generates a new original work with its own so-
cial and artistic value. While part of that value comes from recogni-
tion of the parodied work, the new creation takes on a value unto
itself. In addition, the Court accurately stated that the statutory fac-
tors found in section 107 must be considered as a whole test, and
not as individual measures of fairness. 177 "These factors do not rep-
resent a score card that promises victory to the winner of the
majority."178
The Court categorically rejected the Sixth Circuit's treatment
of the first statutory factor and decisive reliance on the commercial
purpose and character of 2 Live Crew's use.179 While the Sixth Cir-
cuit erred in terminating consideration of the first section 107 fac-
tor upon the finding of the parody's commercial nature, the
Supreme Court properly contemplated a broader sense of the pur-
pose and character of the 2 Live Crew parody. °80 The Court fo-
cused on parody's critical nature and stated that in order for
parody to have a legitimate fair use claim, it must criticize the origi-
nal. 181 However, the Court stated that a parody did not necessarily
have to be targeted at the original as closely as the 2 Live Crew
parody in order to be considered parody by the Court.8 2 Where
the Court fails is in its omission of a clear standard. The Court
never addressed whether a parody which criticizes certain aspects of
society, but not the original, can sustain a fair use claim. The Court
clearly rejected the view that all parody, by its nature, would consti-
tute a fair use and established the critical element of parody as es-
sential for fair use.'8 3
Rather than considering the first factor independently, the
Court applied all four factors in conjunction with one another, con-
sidering the purpose and character in concert with the other sec-
177. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1170-71. All the factors need to be weighed to-
gether with the underlying objectives of copyright in mind. Id.
178. Leval, supra note 25, at 1110. Every factor addresses a different aspect of
the fair use issue. Id. Taken alone, these factors do not carry enough weight for a
finding of fair use or no fair use.
179. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173-74.
180. Id. at 1173.
181. Id. at 1172. The Court not only recognized the critical nature of the 2
Live Crew song, but also acknowledged that this criticism is a facet of categorizing
a work as a parody. Id. at 1173.
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tion 107 factors.184 Whether the parody is in good taste is not an
issue under section 107, and the Court prudently refused to con-
sider this. 185
The Court's analysis of the third statutory factor recognized
that a parodist must "conjure up" the original copyrighted work in
the mind of the listener for the parody to be effective.186 "But if an
intended parody reminds the audience of the original too effec-
tively, it may infringe that work's copyright."18 7 The Court failed to
give concrete guidance for analysis of this factor; any guidance the
Court attempted to give was nebulous at best. While it is true that
the "open-ended" factors of section 107 "call for a fact-intensive
analysis in each case," 8 the Court neglected to provide further
guidance to subsequent courts deciding fair use issues.
The Court's analysis of the fourth statutory factor recognized
the diminishing effect that the difference between the original and
2 Live Crew's version would have on potential market harm.'8 9 The
Court judiciously rejected the use of Sony as controlling precedent
in this case.190 There was a lack of complete and direct duplication
of copyrighted material in the Acuff-Rose case which was present in
Sony.19' However, the Court neglected to discuss the different audi-
ences that the two versions of the song were intended to target. 92
This factor may be helpful in determining the relevant market for
any derivative works, such as a non-parody rap version of "Oh,
Pretty Woman." The Court rendered the potential audience irrele-
184. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1172.
185. Id. In addition, it may not be the duty or privilege of copyright holders
to become "censors of parody." Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429,
1446 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1436 (1994) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
"[P] arody, whether or not in good taste, is the price an artist pays for success....
Id. (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield,J,
dissenting)).
186. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1176. "Parody's humor.., necessarily springs
from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation." Id.
187. David 0. Stewart, Rock Around the Docket: Justices Display Their Musical
Knowledge in Recent Copyright Decisions, ABA J., May 1994, at 50.
188. Id. at 52.
189. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178-79. The original version of the song was a
pop ballad, while the 2 Live Crew version was a rap music parody of the original.
Id. at 1168.
190. Id. at 1177.
191. Id. In Sony, there was a verbatim copy of the original work which led the
Court to determine that market harm would occur. Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
192. See generaly Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1445 (6th
Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (comparing Orbison's middle-America, country
music audience to 2 Live Crew's disaffected audience), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164
(1994).
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vant by holding that the "unlikelihood that creators of imaginative
works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own products
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing
market."193 However, as the Court noted, there was no evidence
presented by either party as to the effect this parody would have on
the market for derivative works, and the Court suggested that this
lack of evidence would be remedied on remand. 194 The Court ig-
nored the fact that these determinations had already been made by
the district court. In granting summary judgment for 2 Live Crew,
the district court found that the intended audiences of the two
songs were completely different, and held that Acuff-Rose had not
presented any evidence that harm to any market had occurred.1 95
The lack of a bright line rule for parodists to follow could open
the floodgates of copyright litigation. However, the Acuff-Rose
Court noted that Congress intended the statute which codified the
Fair Use Doctrine to be "illustrative and not limitative." 196 Only
general direction is given in section 107 because the nature of par-
ody and artistic works is such that no two examples can be analyzed
under the same rigid rule. Nevertheless, the lack of a bright line
rule does not guarantee every parody classification as a fair use
solely because of its parodic nature. The Court preserved the integ-
rity of its opinion by stating that parodies are given no preference
under the Copyright Act and are required to withstand the factor-
based scrutiny of section 107.
V. IMPACT
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Acuff-Rose "has
the potential to advance significantly freedom of expression within
the framework of constitutional and statutory copyright."19 7 Paro-
dists, by definition, require a momentous amount of liberty in or-
der to accomplish the purpose of their art. The Court recognized
that any further restrictions on parodists' freedom would stifle their
193. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178. The Court held this in light of the fact that
the "market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of origi-
nal works would in general develop or license others to develop." Id.
194. Id. at 1178-79.
195. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (M.D. Tenn.
1991). The district court also found that Acuff-Rose could have recorded any ver-
sion of the original song and would not have been harmed by the 2 Live Crew
version because it was a parody. Id.
196. Id. at 1170. This is exemplified by the terms "including" and "such as"
being used in the preamble paragraph of the text. Id.
197. Henry R. Kaufman and Michael K. Cantwell, The Parody Case: 2 Versions,
NAT'L LJ., May 16, 1994, at C1.
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creative efforts and all but eliminate this socially valuable art form.
The "free-fire zone within which critics and parodists get [an ex-
emption from copyright infringement is] commonsensical."l g8
By mandating that all four statutory factors be evaluated as a
whole, and no factor be given greater weight than the others, the
Court has provided a general structure for a case by case analysis of
parody. This approach will prevent lower courts from making the
same type of error that the Sixth Circuit did in giving dispositive
weight to one factor. However, the statutory test enumerated in the
section 107 factors lacks the concrete structure for courts to make
consistent judgments on the issue of fair use. Parodies, by their
nature, vary from one to the next, and it is this aspect of the parody
problem that mandates application of the section 107 factors on a
case-by-case basis. However, the Court overlooked some other po-
tential pitfalls contained within section 107 by focusing for the most
part on the first statutory factor. For example, the Court did not
give a definitive answer as to what markets are encompassed by the
fourth statutory factor, only that the market for "critical reviews"
and "lampoons" is not included.199
When the Court granted certiorari to the Sixth Circuit, it limited
the issue to "whether the petitioners' commercial parody was a 'fair
use' within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. Section 107."200 The only
question the Court actually answered was whether the Sixth Circuit
erred in the supposition that the commercial nature of the parody
presumptively precluded it from classification as a fair use. 20 This
holding was the Court's sole success at clarifying the section 107
factor analysis. The Court never concluded whether this particular
parody was a fair use, and thus further muddied the copyright wa-
ters. The Court stated that the Sixth Circuit had erred in its appli-
cation of the first and fourth factors, but neglected to offer possible
improvements or correct applications of the section 107 analysis of
the facts.
Had the Court decided this case in a manner consistent with
the Sixth Circuit, journalists, writers and performers would be in
constant jeopardy of infringing on the rights of copyright owners
under the Act. The media would be prohibited from mimicking
198. Kurt Anderson, The Freedom to Ridicul TimE, December 13, 1993, at 93.
"If the [Acuff-Rose] court's decision goes the wrong way, it will surely make journal-
ists as well as ironists more hesitant to expose and criticize by mimicking or quot-
ing the powerful and celebrated." Id.
199. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178.
200. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
201. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1179.
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the subjects of their stories and newscasts. Political comedians
would be practically rendered impotent.202 Cartoonists who dabble
in the public arena would also be caught in the middle of this legal
argument. An ancient art form would be lost in a mire of legal
dribble, to the detriment of all society. Despite the missed opportu-
nity to provide lower courts with guidance regarding the applica-
tion of section 107, the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose temporarily
preserved parody and all those who use it to criticize and entertain.
Melissa M. Francis
202. Various performers, satirists and comedians filed amici curiae briefs with
the Court preceding this case. One such group, Capitol Steps Productions, Inc.,
filed a brief in support of 2 Live Crew. Acuff-Rose, 113 S. Ct. at 1642. The Capitol
Steps commented on political figures and current affairs and set these comments
to popular music. Another such performer, Mark Russell uses similar methods in
his political comedy. Both use well-known melodies and substitute their own
words to comment on the current political scene, and both would have been ad-
versely affected by a decision in favor of Acuff-Rose. While both performers par-
ody various popular songs in their comedic criticism, it is unclear whether this
criticism rises to the level required by the Acuff-Rose Court. While these perform-
ances are critical, they do not necessarily criticize the original work, and thus may
not be afforded fair use protection. The Court was not clear on this point.
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